Panel III: Trademarks v. Free Speech in Cyberspace by Katyal, Sonia et al.
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 18 Volume XVIII 
Number 5 Volume XVIII Book 5 Article 5 
2008 
Panel III: Trademarks v. Free Speech in Cyberspace 
Sonia Katyal 
Fordham University School of Law 
Robert Weisbein 
Foley & Lardner LLP 
William McGeveran 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Brett Frischmann 
Loyola University–Chicago School of Law; Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sonia Katyal, Robert Weisbein, William McGeveran, and Brett Frischmann, Panel III: Trademarks v. Free 
Speech in Cyberspace, 18 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1165 (2008). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol18/iss5/5 
This Transcript is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
TRADEMARK_042808_FINAL 5/5/2008 12:30:07 PM 
 
1165 
Panel III: Trademarks v. Free Speech  
in Cyberspace 
Moderator: Sonia Katyal* 
Panelists: Robert Weisbein† 
 William McGeveran‡ 
 Brett Frischmann§ 
MR. HOPKINS: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.  My 
name is Ryan Hopkins.  I am the Symposium Editor.  Thank you 
all again for coming. 
This is our final panel for the day.  This is the trademark panel.  
It will be run by Professor Sonia Katyal. 
I’m closing with this topic because it was my favorite.  This 
past summer, there were two pro bono groups going against each 
other on an issue that I just found intangible as a student: that a 
person coming from the inside of an organization, where his job 
was to promote and protect a trademark, could go online and 
basically, from my point of view, purposefully make that 
trademark generic1 because he can broadcast to a very broad 
audience.  I got to work with this case.2  Even though it is not the 
focus of the panel, it is what created the ideas. 
With that, thank you all again. 
 
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2817.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law. 
† Partner, Foley & Lardner LLP. 
‡ Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. 
§ Professor, Loyola University–Chicago School of Law; Visiting Associate Professor, 
Fordham University School of Law. 
 1 Freedom Calls Found. v. Bukstel, No. 05CV5460(SJ)(VVP), 2006 WL 845509, at 
*12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2006). 
 2 Id. at *1. 
TRADEMARK_042808_FINAL 5/5/2008  12:30:07 PM 
1166 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 18 
The CLE certificates will be outside immediately before the 
reception, so please stop by the table and pick up your certificate 
before we start celebrating the end of this conference. 
And now, I will turn it over to Professor Katyal. 
PROF. KATYAL: Thanks so much, Ryan. 
Greetings and welcome to the third and last panel for today. 
Before we start, I actually just want to congratulate and thank 
the staff of the IPLJ for a really interesting and very enlightening 
day dealing with all of the changing developments of intellectual 
property law, particularly in this digital age. 
In this panel we are going to focus on another very changing 
area of intellectual property, and that involves trademark law and 
its relationship to First Amendment values. 
Years ago, constitutional scholars in our country were 
fascinated with the relationship between copyright and the First 
Amendment.  Cases like Eldred,3 which focus on the 
constitutionality of copyright extension, and organizations like 
Creative Commons4 and many others, Chilling Effects5 and so on, 
helped us to understand the complexities of copyright policies and 
their relationship to freedom of speech. 
Today I actually think that it is fair to say that many of those 
same policy questions are coming up in a different context, in the 
trademark context.  But they also raise very similar implications 
about the complexity of the relationship between intellectual 
property law and freedom of expression.  I think that this larger 
policy tension that we have been talking about today between 
property and speech in the trademark context translates into a 
series of smaller, and I would say more discrete, conflicts in the 
trademark context. 
I think that what they do is they force us to ask how to redraw 
the boundaries of the relationship between intellectual property and 
freedom of speech, particularly when we are not just dealing with 
 
 3 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 4 Creative Commons, http://www.creativecommons.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). 
 5 Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Apr. 7, 
2008). 
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the marketplace of ideas but we are also dealing with the 
marketplace of goods.  So, for example, just to review some of the 
interesting developments in trademark law, there have been some 
very interesting cases that address the boundaries between 
commercial and noncommercial speech, both in the infringement 
context as well as in the dilution6 context, which we will talk about 
today, and also, in particular, dealing with domain names and the 
Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act,7 which is something that I am 
sure our speakers will mention. 
So even aside from this boundary between commercial and 
noncommercial speech, we are also seeing a very interesting trend 
regarding the potential uses of other causes of action, like 
trademark disparagement, in federal cases.  This is something that 
we have seen in the Freecycle8 case, which is something that we 
will also address during this panel as well.  In that case, a federal 
court barred a plaintiff from making comments that could be 
construed to disparage upon the possible trademark in a company 
known as The Freecycle Network.9  It raises issues of genericness 
and so on, which is something that we will also address in this 
panel.  The question that that case posed was the issue of whether 
or not a preliminary injunction in this context was operating as a 
prior restraint.  We will hear some different perspectives on this 
case and the Ninth Circuit’s disposition shortly. 
The last issue that I want to throw out there, aside from 
commerciality and disparagement, is the kind of ever-widening 
issue of technology, which is something that Ryan just spoke 
about.  How should the law address the role of technology, things 
like gripe sites, domain name disputes, in the context of trademark 
law?  Are there ways in which technology is changing law, or the 
reverse? 
And what about the First Amendment?  As I think Hugh 
Hansen mentioned in the prior panel, is the First Amendment 
merely, in Hugh’s words, “a vessel for policy decisions?”  Or is it 
 
 6 See, e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 7 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000). 
 8 Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 9 Id. at 900. 
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something more substantive; is it something more compelling than 
trademark law has treated it in the past? 
Those are some of the questions that we will be talking about 
in this panel.  To address these concerns we have a very 
distinguished panel of speakers. 
We will hear from our first panelist, who is Brett Frischmann, 
who is visiting with us from Loyola University in Chicago.  So 
without further ado, Brett. 
PROF. FRISCHMANN: All right.  Hello again, although there 
are some new faces out there. 
I am going to basically just pick up where I left off this 
morning.  We had a short amount of time and Hugh didn’t let me 
say everything I wanted to say, so I’ve got more to say today.  
Many of you in the audience may not have been here this morning, 
so I am going to just briefly recap a couple of the basic points I 
made and then extend it to trademark.  I will just summarize what I 
said this morning. 
First, the digital networked environment that has emerged 
recently, the Internet, has had a significant impact on cultural, 
economic, social systems and the laws that regulate those systems.  
I laid out a couple of areas of law where this comes up.  Copyright 
and trademark are hotly contested.  They are evolving as 
technology is evolving, as markets are evolving, in this 
environment.  At the core of many of these debates in these various 
fields, there seem to be First Amendment concerns lurking.  As a 
result, I think the intersection of the First Amendment with 
copyright and trademark is fertile ground for rethinking and 
change. 
At a broad, macro level, the Supreme Court suggested—
perhaps inadvertently, but nonetheless that’s still something we 
can pay attention to—an avenue for pursuing such change in its 
Eldred decision, where it stated that so long as “Congress has not 
altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further 
First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”10  That is, we might 
presume that the existing contours, including the built-in 
 
 10 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
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safeguards of idea/expression and fair use, properly mediate 
copyright with the First Amendment. 
This morning I talked a little bit about the Golan11 decision in 
the Tenth Circuit, which picked up on this analysis, maybe as a 
baby first step into what might turn out to be an emerging inquiry 
into the First Amendment and copyright. 
Then I suggested that the “traditional contours,” particularly 
those contours that mediate copyright with the First Amendment, 
might become deficient from a First Amendment perspective 
because of changes wrought by Congress, and perhaps also 
because of changes in the underlying social and technological 
environment.  That is, if, as Yochai Benkler has argued, the digital 
networked environment fundamentally changes our participatory 
potential and how we relate to expressive content as well as to each 
other,12 then we might expect or want to see increased First 
Amendment scrutiny of both copyright and trademark. 
So Eldred suggests the “traditional contours” analysis that we 
might apply, for better or for worse.13  Should it be extended to 
trademark law? 
The simple answer is: how could it not be?  Trademark law is 
fundamentally a body of law that regulates speech.  To the extent 
that speech is plainly commercial speech—for example, speech 
that merely proposes or executes a transaction—then it is so called 
“low-value speech” within the First Amendment world, and thus 
not subject to the type of scrutiny applied to so-called “high-value 
speech,” like political speech.14 
But as we all know, the words, images, symbols, and devices 
that can function as trademarks—that is, that serve the trademark 
function of creating and maintaining associations with source—are 
also incredibly powerful speech devices for communicating 
messages about various things, including but certainly not limited 
 
 11 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 12 See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2007), available at 
http://www.benkler.org/wealth_of_networks/index.php/Download_PDFs_of_the_book. 
 13 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
 14 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553–55 (2001). 
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to the trademark owner or the trademark owner’s goods and 
services.  It is precisely because of the powerful trademark 
meaning that trademarks garner in the marketplace of goods and 
services that trademarks are valuable tools for generating and 
communicating meaning in the marketplace of ideas.  That is an 
important concept to keep in mind, I think, as we think about 
trademark and the First Amendment. 
Trademark law, like copyright law, regulates certain uses of 
protected expression, but not all uses.  Both bodies of laws draw 
careful lines and boundaries—or contours, if you will—that leave a 
variety of uses free for the public, for engaging in public 
conversation, for public speech.15 
Trademarks traditionally operate in market settings where 
consumer confusion is likely.  It is concerned with competition, 
with efficient markets, harms to consumers associated with 
deception or misleading practices.16  But in non-market settings, 
where consumer confusion is unlikely, trademark law has not 
traditionally been operational. 
But even beyond the broad boundaries that delineate where 
trademark does and does not reach—that is, the boundaries 
established by concepts such as use in commerce and consumer 
confusion—there are additional doctrinal limits, mainly defenses, 
that further carve out space for the use of trademarks for 
communicative purposes that implicate core First Amendment 
concerns. 
Now, I don’t intend to map out the areas where the “traditional 
contours” analysis suggested in Eldred for copyright law might 
arise in trademark law.  I think some of our panelists are going to 
touch on some of those. 
 
 15 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (providing the factors to be considered in determining 
the “fair use of a copyrighted work”); 1–800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc. 414 F.3d 
400, 406–07 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that “[i]n order to prevail on a trademark 
infringement claim” a plaintiff must establish, amongst other things, that “the defendant 
used the mark . . . in commerce . . . in connection with the sale . . . or advertising of 
goods or services”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 16 See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th ed. 2008). 
TRADEMARK_042808_FINAL 5/5/2008  12:30:07 PM 
2008] TRADEMARKS V. FREE SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE 1171 
I suppose dilution law17 is perhaps an area where significant 
changes have in fact occurred and where some, such as Diane 
Zimmerman and Rebecca Tushnet, I believe have argued for 
intense First Amendment scrutiny, for revisiting the traditional 
contours of this intersection between the First Amendment and 
trademark law as we understand it. 
Let me, instead, turn to a few examples that the students have 
brought to our attention.  I would like to suggest again, as I did this 
morning, that the digital networked environment may provoke 
struggles at the intersection of the First Amendment and 
trademark, and I’d like to say a few words about how that arises, 
give us some context for understanding them. 
One of the cases that the students referenced in the materials 
that they sent to us to prepare and to think about for this 
conversation was the Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. 2002 
decision out of the Ninth Circuit.18  It is otherwise known as the 
“Barbie Doll” case or the “Barbie Girl” case.  In 1997, the Danish 
band Aqua released its song “Barbie Girl.”  The quality is not so 
great.  Nonetheless, the song comments on and makes fun of 
Barbie. 
PROF. KATYAL: It’s a great song. 
PROF. McGEVERAN: I really like it.  I bought it. 
PROF. FRISCHMANN: When I listened to it, I wasn’t— 
PROF. KATYAL: “Life in plastic, it’s fantastic.” 
PROF. McGEVERAN: It’s on my iPod actually, but I bought it 
legally. 
PROF. FRISCHMANN: I wasn’t even going to say that, but 
then I thought I’d just throw it out there.  I don’t think the song is 
that great.  Nonetheless, it effectively comments on and makes fun 
of Barbie.  Mattel sues for trademark infringement and dilution.  In 
the end, the Ninth Circuit rejects Mattel’s claims, relying heavily 
on First Amendment considerations, properly in my view. 
 
 17 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-98 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000)); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, at § 24.67. 
 18 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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In my view, this sort of challenge is really just the tip of the 
iceberg for poor old Barbie.  The problems that Barbie or Mattel 
face in cyberspace may be emblematic of the sorts of disputes we 
can expect in the future.  Many trademark owners face similar 
challenges of brand and image management in cyberspace. 
So what has happened to Barbie in cyberspace?  What changes 
has the Internet wrought?  The cultural significance of Barbie has 
changed over time and is dependent upon who says authoritatively 
what Barbie means.  Before the emergence of the digital 
networked environment, the Internet and all its enabling 
communications technologies, Mattel more or less had effective 
control over the mass communication of messages regarding 
Barbie, largely through commercial advertising and distribution, 
effectively through use of some channels made available by 
trademark.  Mattel had no control over what people said privately, 
or what they said even in most small-group settings.  But any such 
communications had little significance in shaping cultural 
meaning. 
With the emergence of the digital networked environment, 
Mattel has lost some degree of control, and as a result, individuals 
have gained some capacity to shape the cultural meaning of 
Barbie, a meaning that certainly appears to be contested if one 
simply searches Google for “Barbie.”19  There are many more 
culturally significant meanings, views of Barbie that have meaning 
in different cultural settings.  More people have the capacity to 
participate in public conversations about Barbie and about related 
concepts that Barbie evokes, and more people exercise that 
capacity. 
 
 19 See, e.g., Barbie.com, http://barbie.everythinggirl.com (“Contains activities to play, 
create and learn new things, photos, facts, and doll information for collectors.”) (the first 
result returned in a Google search for “Barbie,” conducted Feb. 23, 2008); 
BarbieCollector.com, http://www.barbiecollector.com (“The official Mattel site for 
Barbie Collector featuring a Doll Showcase including 600+ Barbie Collector dolls dating 
back to 1980, plus news . . . .”) (the second result returned in a Google search for 
“Barbie,” conducted Feb. 23, 2008); The Distorted Barbie, http://www.detritus.net/ 
projects/barbie (“Barbie as you’ve never seen her before.  Explore the images, humor, 
and psychology of the Barbie phenomenon.”) (the fourth result returned in a Google 
search for “Barbie,” conducted Feb. 23, 2008). 
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Perhaps more importantly, people learn that Barbie’s meaning 
is in fact contestable; that is, the meaning advertised and sold by 
Mattel is but one of many possibilities, and the meaningful 
participation in the contest of meaning-making, determining what 
Barbie means, what it stands for in society, is itself possible.  We 
can participate in that contest. 
This reflects, in my view, a significant advance from a First 
Amendment perspective, although it does raise complicated issues 
potentially at the interface with trademark law.  I tend to think that 
the existing trademark law framework is well equipped—better 
equipped that copyright law I should say—to deal with these sets 
of issues.  But we’ll see. 
We’ve got things like use in commerce and consumer 
confusion to define some of the scope of where trademark reaches.  
Arguably, there is a debate going on right now among trademark 
scholars about whether or not there is a trademark use requirement, 
whether use of someone else’s mark in a trademark fashion is a 
prerequisite to bringing an infringement cause of action.20  
Whether or not that succeeds—and some courts have recognized 
it—trademark use is another doctrine that mediates this balance.  
In other words, non-trademark uses are fair game, and thus would 
be okay from both a trademark and a First Amendment 
perspective. 
But then there are also things like genericness and the way we 
approach the hurdles to getting into the trademark system.  For 
example, we do not give trademark protection to merely 
descriptive trademarks until they actually acquire distinctiveness.21  
But also there are things like nominative fair use,22 ordinary 
descriptive fair use.23  Noncommercial expression of an idea, in 
itself, has in some courts been found to be protected by the First 
 
 20 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in 
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, 
Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669 (2007) 
[hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law]. 
 21 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2000); Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 
F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 22 See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 231–32 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
 23 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). 
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Amendment.24  And then, of course, in dilution law we have things 
like a trademark use requirement25 and we have the defenses 
connected with parody,26 commenting on the mark,27 and so on.  
So I think there are existing doctrines within trademark that may 
work pretty well in dealing with these issues, although I think we 
are going to see them pop up more and more in the future. 
To use one of the examples, if you think about gripe sites,28 
one way of mediating the First Amendment and trademark with 
respect to gripe sites is just to say, “We can rely on the likelihood 
of confusion test.”  Well, it is hard to see whether there is 
likelihood of confusion where you are saying “Mattel sucks.”  
Who thinks that Mattel is somehow authorizing or behind or 
associated with that site owner? 
But yet, as expressed by some of the people who have 
participated in this trademark use debate, the debate about whether 
trademark use ought to matter, one of the contentions is—and 
you’ve got to think about this generally, for those students out 
there—where within the structure of the law these kinds of 
defenses and these kinds of doctrines come up.  Are they 
gatekeepers, the sort of qualification criteria, when you first get 
into the trademark system?  Likelihood of confusion isn’t there.  
You’ve got to go through quite a bit to get a finding of likelihood 
of confusion. 
Defenses are even further down the line.  If we want the First 
Amendment balance to be struck, where do we want it struck?  Do 
we want it struck at the likelihood of confusion stage, figuring out 
whether there is an infringement?  Do we want it struck at the 
defense stage?  Do we want it struck in the remedies, because 
some courts have in fact tailored some of the remedies with 
concerns of First Amendment?  Or do we want it dealt with more 
 
 24 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1003–04 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 25 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); 1–800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 
400, 406–08 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 26 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 
907 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 27 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii); Mattel, 296 F.3d at 907. 
 28 “A gripe site is a type of website devoted to the critique and or mockery of a person, 
place, politician, corporation or institution.” Gripe site, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gripe_site (last visited Feb. 20, 2007). 
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up front, which is the argument for a trademark use requirement?  
Trademark use would be something we could decide in a more 
summary fashion up front. 
This is just one way to think about the ways in which First 
Amendment concerns are going to work their way into different 
trademark disputes that I think we are going to see more and more 
in the online context. 
I can stop there.  I think that sets up some of the other 
discussions. 
PROF. KATYAL: Thanks so much, Brett. 
Our next speaker is Bill McGeveran from the University of 
Minnesota Law School. 
[See article below in lieu of presentation transcript.]29 
PROF. KATYAL: Great.  Thanks so much. 
Our last speaker is Robert Weisbein from Darby & Darby. 
MR. WEISBEIN: Good afternoon.  It’s good to see everybody 
came back after lunch, or many people.  Oftentimes the after-lunch 
lecture is the least attended, but there’s a pretty good audience 
here.  We appreciate that. 
I am here to give more of the general practitioner’s point of 
view.  I think my two panelists got a lot of things right. 
I am not so sure that having additional carve-outs in the 
infringement section would be the way to go necessarily.  The 
statute does already include two provisions that deal with free 
speech.30  I think the authors of the Lanham Act31 were very 
concerned about that, particularly in some of the recent 
amendments to the dilution statute. 
The first one, which Bill talked about, was § 33(b)(4).32  That 
deals with the right of somebody to use a trademark in a 
descriptive manner.  That is a carve-out.  It is a defense.  What it 
 
 29 William McGevern, Four Free Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1205 (2008). 
 30 See infra notes 47, 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 31 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141. 
 32 Id. § 1115(b)(4). 
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says is that it will not be infringement if somebody uses a term or a 
device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith 
only to describe the goods or services of such party.  So it is sort of 
the trademark law of saying, “Hey listen, Mr. Trademark Owner.  
If you adopt a mark that is descriptive, there is going to be some 
risk to you that other people are going to be able to use that term in 
connection with advertising, speech-related content, and things like 
that, and it is not going to be infringement.”  The issue that then 
comes up is: Well, what is “fairly and in good faith”? 
I have an example from a case.33  I will just pass this out and I 
will ask you by show of hands what you think.  I’ll just set up the 
case a little bit as it is being handed out. 
We represented a manufacturer of infants’ clothing and 
bedding.  We have a registered trademark for the term “just born” 
for these kinds of products.  Gerber came out with a line of infants’ 
clothing, which was under the Gerber trademark, but they were 
using “just born” as what they claimed as the size designation of 
these particular clothes. 
It is also interesting to note that the person who is now the 
president of this division for Gerber was somebody who 
interviewed for an executive position at our client, where we 
described to him how important this trademark was to us and what 
our marketing plans were and everything and why we felt that this 
was a mark of great value to the company.  He ultimately did not 
get the job, and then he went on to work for Gerber.  Shortly after 
he did that, they had a whole new project to come up with a new 
size designation for what are typically called either “premie” or 
“newborn.”  But yet they decided that they were going to call their 
size designation “just born.”  So they stood behind this defense, the 
§ 33(b)(4) defense. 
You’ve had a chance to look at it.  By a show of hands, how 
many people think that that is a descriptive fair use or that looks 
like a trademark use to you?  Descriptive fair use?  Trademark use?  
Sort of split. 
 
 33 Triboro Quilt MFG. Corp. v. Gerber Childrenswear, Inc., No. 1:2006cv06268 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 17, 2006), available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/court-
nysdce/case_no-1:2006cv06268/case_id-288584. 
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Unfortunately for you, there was no decision.  But I can tell 
you that Gerber actually waived the attorney-client privilege 
because they got an opinion from counsel that said that what they 
planned to do would qualify as a descriptive fair use. 
I deposed the attorney.  It became clear to me that his opinion 
was very flawed.  He didn’t look at many things that he should 
have looked at.  First of all, he was asked to give this opinion sort 
of in a vacuum.  He was not shown that packaging and asked to 
give an opinion on that.  He was just asked, if they were to use it as 
a size designation, would that be okay.  His answer essentially was 
yes. 
I can tell you that the next day when his deposition continued, 
we immediately went into settlement discussions and the case was 
resolved, and they do not use that mark anymore. 
So the Trademark Act34 does take into account considerations 
of free speech and not wanting to give somebody the exclusive 
monopoly to use words that should be in the public domain.  That 
is one example. 
The other example is in the recently enacted amendment to the 
Dilution Act, in the “Dilution by Blurring” section, where they say 
that it is an exclusion that “[t]he following shall not be actionable 
as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this 
subsection,” and they talk about “any fair use, including a 
nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, 
of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of 
source for the person’s own goods or services.”35  Then they go on 
and they identify parody, criticism, commenting upon the goods or 
services of the famous mark owner. 
A recent case that just actually came down from the Fourth 
Circuit the other day that dealt with this fair use exception, the 
parody exception, was the “Chewy Vuiton” case.36  I think 
probably a lot of you are familiar with that case.  It has gotten an 
incredible amount of press.  In that case, the company Haute 
 
 34 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
 35 Id. § 1125(c)(3). 
 36 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C. (Haute Diggity Dog II), 
507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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Diggity Dog, which is a very small company, came out with a line 
of dog chewable toys and a dog bed and they mimicked, parodied, 
the well-known LOUIS VUITTON “LV” trademark and the 
redesigned monogram trademark with the multicolor “LV” on the 
white background, and they were selling these little dog chewies 
under the name “Chewy Vuiton.” 
Well, Louis Vuitton as a trademark owner doesn’t have a very 
good sense of humor.  I can tell you, as I litigated against them.  
They take their trademarks very, very seriously.  They litigated this 
case, and they lost at the district court level.37  The district court 
judge found that it was a parody and that there would be no 
likelihood of confusion. 
Louis Vuitton appealed.  There were several amicus briefs put 
in, including one from the INTA, the International Trademark 
Association, saying that the judge got it totally wrong, he never 
really applied the factors set forth in the statute, and that it couldn’t 
possibly have been a parody, they couldn’t come within the parody 
exclusion, because the use of “Chewy Vuiton” on the pocketbooks 
was use as a trademark to designate source, and therefore the 
parody exclusion was out as a defense.38 
The court actually, in my view from reading a lot of the briefs, 
got it right.  They upheld the district court’s decision in finding 
that there was no dilution or infringement.39  They said: Well, 
parody can be a 100 percent defense if you are not using the other 
person’s mark or your parody mark, the “Chewy Vuiton” mark, as 
an indication of source of origin.  But even if you are, parody can 
still be used.  It is not a complete defense, but it can still be a 
consideration in the regular analysis of determining whether there 
is a likelihood of dilution. 
I don’t think that anybody ever was really arguing that.  The 
court sort of did that on its own and, I think, rightly so.  They 
found that just applying the regular six factors that are in the 
 
 37 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C. (Haute Diggity Dog I), 
464 F. Supp. 2d 495 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
 38 Brief for Int’l Trademark Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, 20, 
Haute Diggity Dog II, 507 F.3d 252 (No. 06–2267). 
 39 Haute Diggity Dog II, 507 F.3d at 256–57. 
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statute and looking at it as a parody, that when you compared all 
those factors and balanced them, there could be no dilution.  The 
court found the parody to be a good one and that nobody would be 
likely to be confused.  So I think there, in that sense, free speech 
prevailed. 
Free speech has been an issue in the trademark context long 
before the Internet became involved.40  As Bill said, most of the 
times they get it right, but you can look back and there are 
instances where they got it wrong. 
I think one of those instances was a case back in 1987, long 
before the Internet was around.  It is a pretty famous case, the 
Mutual of Omaha case.41  In that case, the defendant was against 
nuclear power, so he was out there using his platform to be against 
nuclear power.  His slogan was “Mutant of Omaha,” as opposed to 
“Mutual of Omaha.”  He stood behind that there would be no 
likelihood of confusion.  He felt that he had a First Amendment 
right to do that. 
The court rejected that First Amendment defense, balancing it 
against the plaintiff trademark owner’s property rights in the 
“Mutual of Omaha” mark.  The court weighed heavily the fact that 
it wasn’t just noncommercial speech that this gentleman was 
engaged in; there was some commercial component to it because 
he happened to be selling mugs and T-shirts, to raise money for his 
cause, which had “Mutant of Omaha” on them.  Therefore, they 
found it was trademark use, another thing that Bill and Brett both 
talked about, and found confusion. 
That is an Eighth Circuit decision back in 1987.  I think maybe 
today that might not come out the same way.  But I think that was 
one that was decided incorrectly.  Again, the point simply is that 
this issue of free speech and trademark law and the competing 
interests has been around a long time, and there is a whole host of 
decisions about that. 
Just turning to the “chilling effect” argument, that is sort of true 
in the entire context of trademark infringement.  It is oftentimes the 
 
 40 See generally, Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 187 (2004). 
 41 Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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big guy against the little guy.  It is not just in the context of free 
speech.  So I’m not sure that we should have certain exemptions to 
help out the little guy, necessarily, in the free speech context.  
Believe me, I represent plenty of small companies, who come to 
us, who get an opinion of counsel that they are free to adopt that 
trademark, and “if ABC company comes after you, we think you 
have good defenses.” 
A lot of times companies say, “Listen, I’m going to take the 
safest course of action.  I’m not looking for any problems.  We 
won’t go with that mark.”  The reason is they don’t want to get 
embroiled in a litigation that will be well into the six figures, take a 
long time to resolve, and put a cloud over their trademark rights.  
They walk away from it.  Or in the case where somebody does 
adopt a mark and they get a cease-and-desist letter, they just walk 
away from it because they do not want to spend the money. 
That happens all throughout the trademark infringement 
context.  It is not a problem that is unique to the First Amendment 
people.  I’m not sure the First Amendment people have a better 
right, to somehow have an advantage over people who are using 
the mark in either a quasi-commercial context or in a commercial 
context. 
For the most part, I think, with the domain cases that have 
evolved significantly over the years,  I think it is, as Bill and Brett 
both pointed out, pretty clear now how you have to craft your Web 
site and how you have to select a domain name in order to get a 
free pass, so to speak.  I think the cases have been fairly consistent 
over the last few years, particularly all the gripe site cases. 
I think the rule of thumb, frankly, is—and it is pretty easy to 
follow—you have to pick a domain name that is not likely to cause 
confusion.  If you add the word “sucks” or some other disparaging 
term in there, you are pretty much home free.  If your domain 
name is the exact trademark of the trademark owner, that could 
probably get you into trouble.  And then, within your site, as long 
as you are not doing anything of a commercial nature and it is 
pretty much a noncommercial site, you should be pretty much 
home free. 
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As a lawyer who represents a fair amount of high-profile 
trademark owners, I think trademark owners initially were going 
after every domain name. 
We represent Nokia.  I’m not saying this was their policy, but 
just by way of example, if you had “Nokia” in your domain name, 
they were going after you. 
We represented Toys“R”Us.  They had an incredibly 
aggressive policy.42  If you were “Tanks‘R’Us,” “Cars‘R’Us”—
and there were plenty of pornography sites that were using 
“‘R’Us” with various body parts in there—I won’t go into them—
“[Blank]‘R’Us”—you could be sure that Toys“R”Us was going to 
be sending you a cease-and-desist letter.  If you didn’t stop, they 
would sue you.  Some of the first domain name cases were 
Toys“R”Us domain name cases, and they were very successful. 
But companies don’t want to spend the money on legal fees.  
In-house trademark counsel are very familiar with the case law.  
They pick and choose their battles very carefully now, for the most 
part.  That is what I have been seeing. 
I think if you are running a legitimate gripe site—companies 
also don’t like bad publicity.  It’s incredible.  They run everything 
by their P.R. department.  They don’t want to be blogged to death.  
They are very sensitive to that.  So I think it has to be a pretty 
egregious use of their trademark that is really tarnishing their 
reputation and goodwill, before they take action. 
PROF. KATYAL: Great.  Thank you so much. 
Before we stop and turn it over to questions from the 
audience—and we have a fair amount of time to do that—I 
actually want to focus on something that you just said, Rob, and 
hear some of the other views of our panelists on this. 
It seems to me that when I think about the comments all three 
of you have made, there is really this fundamental tension in all of 
your different presentations about a presumption, maybe an 
optimistic presumption, in the formal power of law.  That is to say, 
you, Bill, and you, Brett, talked about how the development of 
 
 42 See, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Abir, No. 97 Civ. 8673, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1275 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1999). 
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trademark law now is in this realm where people are relatively 
protective of First Amendment interests.  That is due largely, I 
think, to the Ninth Circuit, and we can even say perhaps Judge 
Kozinski, himself, who I think has really done a wonderful job in 
authoring a lot of these opinions.43 
But I think that the comments that you were making, Rob, 
which I think end up in a similarly optimistic place, but something 
that I want to hear a little bit more from the other two panelists 
about, is the idea that now it seems to me that even if you have 
great and very protective case law supporting First Amendment 
interests, there is I think perhaps still this informal world where 
lawyers are regularly issuing cease-and-desist letters for things that 
they think might not necessarily confuse the customer but might in 
some ways tarnish or harm the value of the reputation.  I think you 
are right to say that it started off with gripe sites.  And maybe it is 
true that, as you say, your clients are far more thoughtful about the 
P.R. risks of going after the little guy. 
But I wonder, just from looking at a clearinghouse like Chilling 
Effects,44 and then the database that Bill was speaking about, if the 
care and carefulness that you see in your clients is something that I 
think people regularly see.  So I guess my question really is: If we 
do have great precedents on the books, what other ways are there 
to protect the voice of the consumer when we are faced with all of 
these informal ways—I mean it is relatively cheap to issue a cease-
and-desist letter.  If you are dealing with a poor artist or a poor 
consumer who is terrified of IP law, that is a very quick way of 
shutting down that individual’s freedom of expression.  I’m 
curious to hear all of your views about if there are other ways in 
which the law can opt against that kind of private chilling of 
expression. 
PROF. FRISCHMANN: We all said that trademark law has a 
bunch of doctrines that are accommodating of First Amendment 
interests.  We also said that the courts tend to get it right in the end.  
 
 43 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 44 Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Feb. 22, 
2008). 
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The Freecycle45 case is an example.  Eventually, at least in my 
opinion, the court of appeals got it right.  The district court got it 
wrong. 
So I think our points were that trademark law is 
accommodating, but it’s not perfect.  So the question I was raising 
about where in the process do you want to synch the safeguards—
and you might want some overlap, so you’ve got consumer 
confusion and defenses as a backstop—but to deal with the chilling 
effects you need to have something that is categorical at the very 
beginning. 
I think Bill was pointing in the direction of how should we start 
to think about categorical rules rather than case-specific, fact-
specific rules.  Some categorical rules—you know, can we take 
news reporting and define little categories and say, “There’s this 
category, there’s that category”?  That’s one approach.  I’d be 
happy for us to take that conversation on, to say: Do we want to 
take a categorical approach, so we define different categories of 
speech and think about whether or not we can do that well?  Is a 
trademark use requirement, actually if you used it as Lemley and 
Dogan46 are suggesting it ought to be used you know, they claim it 
is already in there and that it ought to be developed more fully.  In 
other words, you do not trigger an infringement cause of action or 
a dilution cause of action in the absence of the defendant using the 
plaintiff’s mark in a trademark way, as a signal of source for goods 
or services.  That categorically knocks out a tremendous number of 
cases in a way that you could perhaps make the law clear for many 
of the people who are otherwise chilled. 
And I think there are other approaches.  You could imagine a 
very strong—instead of subcategories, along the lines of news 
reporting and parody and other things, you could imagine just 
having a very broad First Amendment categorical defense.  I don’t 
actually want to advocate that.  I don’t think that is necessarily the 
 
 45 Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 46 See Dogan & Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law, supra note 20; Stacey L. Dogan 
& Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution Cases (Stanford Pub. 
Law Working Paper No. 1033165, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1033165 
[hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, The Trademark Use Requirement]. 
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right approach.  But there is a spectrum of different ways we can 
deal with it. 
I think the law can do it, but I think the law is not currently 
structured to do it effectively right now. 
PROF. McGEVERAN: I would say two things. 
One thing I’d say is that I do think my comments were directed 
towards fixing the law, but that is clearly not itself, alone, enough.  
I think you need a lot more availability of advice and counsel to 
people who could need it.  I’m not talking about people who can 
pay their bills. I’m not trying to take work away from you, Rob. 
But we are seeing, I think, a trend.  It’s not as fast as we might 
like it, but in both copyright and trademark you are seeing—
particularly in law schools and projects associated with law 
schools, but also other places—some provision of pro bono advice 
to people who end up with cease-and-desist letters, which are not 
only cheap to issue, they are also pretty cheap to respond to.  So it 
is a task that is well suited to organized pro bono response.  The 
Stanford Center47 is doing a lot of that.  The Citizen Media Law 
Project that I mentioned48 is moving to do that in the trademark 
area as well. 
There is also an important aspect of it that is communities of 
users organizing themselves to educate one another about everyday 
practices that they have and how those practices line up with the 
law.  In both copyright and trademark, I think we are also starting 
to see that, with various projects trying to develop best-practices 
documents about the use of copyrights and trademarks in, for 
example, documentary film or user-generated content online.49  I 
 
 47 Stanford Center for Internet and Society, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2008). 
 48 Citizen Media Law Project, http://www.citmedialaw.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 49 See Peter Jaszi, Copyright, Fair Use and Motion Pictures, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 715 
(2007); Am. Univ. Ctr. for Social Media, D.C., Documentary Filmmakers’ Statement of 
Best Practices in Fair Use, Nov. 18, 2005, available at 
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/fair_use_final.pdf; Am. Univ. Ctr. for 
Social Media, D.C., The Good, the Bad, and the Confusing: User-Generated Video 
Creators on Copyright, April 3, 2007, available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/ 
files/pdf/good_bad_confusing.pdf. 
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think that those kinds of informational initiatives can really do a lot 
too. 
So, the first thing I would say is that fixing the law alone is not 
enough.  We have to allow people who are not lawyers, just actual 
everyday users of trademarks, to understand the scope of 
permissible uses—and, by the way, what kinds of uses are not 
permissible, so they don’t do it.  There are plenty of uses out there 
that may be expressive uses but are cases that should lose.  That’s 
the first thing. 
The other thing I would say is—and this is actually responding 
to one thing that Rob said and one thing that Brett said—a lot of 
the problem comes in when we start to get very fact-specific about 
confusion in an individual situation.  That is what makes a case 
take a long time. 
My concern about what is happening with § 33(b)(4),50 and to 
some extent now with these dilution carve-outs,51 is that the 
defenses are starting to get structured like this: “You are allowed to 
use this trademark as long as it is not confusing.  What’s 
confusing?  Whatever presents a likelihood of confusion.”  Then 
we are right back where we started.  As I say, in hard cases that is 
the appropriate place to be.  But if that is how all of these doctrines 
develop, you end up not having anything but likelihood of 
confusion.  By the way, I recognize that some of the statutory 
language may force that to be the case, but then that’s a problem of 
the statutory language. 
I think that actually the same is true of Dogan and Lemley’s 
hope for a trademark use requirement, which Brett mentioned.52 In 
the end, using something “as a mark” is only definable by what 
people perceive as a source-identifying use.  I don’t think that it 
can serve the kind of threshold gatekeeper function that they are 
hoping for.  Mark McKenna at St. Louis University has a great 
 
 50 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). 
 51 Id. § 1125(c)(3), amended by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006). 
 52 Dogan & Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law, supra note 20, at 1690–98; see also 
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the 
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 786–88 (2004) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, 
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs]. 
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paper out there now where he goes through a long historical 
analysis to say that Dogan and Lemley are correct, there is a 
trademark use requirement; but it doesn’t do any good because it 
ends up collapsing into likelihood of confusion.53  I think he’s got 
that just about right. 
So if there are situations that repeat themselves, that we can 
predict are unlikely as a category to yield likelihood of confusion 
results, my proposition would be: let’s not go through the case-by-
case analysis in those types of cases.  There will be other cases that 
will be hard cases that will fall outside those categories, and then 
we will end up considering likelihood of confusion.  But it doesn’t 
seem to me that § 33(b)(4) or the dilution carve-outs as they are 
developing, or trademark use as it is being discussed, are doing 
what needs to happen. 
PROF. FRISCHMANN: Can I ask you a quick question? 
PROF. McGEVERAN: Yes. 
PROF. FRISCHMANN: In terms of defining categories, aren’t 
you willing to tolerate some confusion or some likelihood of 
confusion within some of those categories? 
PROF. McGEVERAN: Yes, right.  So in some cases that are in 
these categories there might be some potential confusion.  That’s 
what the Supreme Court says in KP Permanent54 about the 
§ 33(b)(4) defense.  KP Permanent is a unanimous Supreme Court 
opinion.  The Ninth Circuit55 was saying that you cannot use this 
affirmative defense until it has first been held that there is no 
confusion; but if it has first been held that there is no confusion, 
the case has ended. 
MR. WEISBEIN: And that the burden was on the defendant. 
PROF. McGEVERAN: Right, at least arguably, for procedural 
reasons, the burden could have been on the defendant to show it.  
So either the burden was on the defendant to show it in advance or 
 
 53 Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source in Trademark Law 
(Jan. 18, 2008) (unpublished draft), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088479. 
 54 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. (KP II), 543 U.S. 111 
(2004). 
 55 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. (KP I), 328 F.3d 1061, 
1073 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, KP II, 543 U.S. 111 (2004). 
TRADEMARK_042808_FINAL 5/5/2008  12:30:07 PM 
2008] TRADEMARKS V. FREE SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE 1187 
the defense had to wait until after the plaintiff failed in a prima 
facie case.  Either way, the § 33(b)(4) defense wasn’t doing any 
good, wasn’t doing any extra work. 
So the Supreme Court makes this big declaration and remands 
it down to the Ninth Circuit.  What happens?  The Ninth Circuit 
then says: “Okay, fine.  We are going to remand it down to the 
district court.  But the potentially confusing nature of the use could 
bear on the issue of whether it was done ‘fairly and in good 
faith’”—as Rob points out—”so we are going to remand for them 
to do our Sleekcraft likelihood of confusion test,56 and only after 
they have done that should they consider this defense.”57  That 
sounds to me very much like what the Supreme Court said not to 
do.  In terms of the actual procedural posture of a case, it is still not 
going to be a terribly efficient way for somebody to find out 
whether their use is fair or not in litigation. 
PROF. FRISCHMANN: How would you define your 
categories, on the basis of whether or not there is predictively no 
likelihood of confusion, which is what I think you originally 
started saying; or are there categories where the nature of the use 
itself matters because it triggers First Amendment issues or 
triggers noncommercial speech issues, which may very well lead to 
some confusion in some contexts, but nonetheless we still define 
the category? 
PROF. McGEVERAN: Right. 
PROF. FRISCHMANN: In other words, if you could 
categorically define a category where there is no likelihood of 
confusion, we can predict that ahead of time, sure, that’s seems 
like an easy case to define that category. 
From a categorical approach, I think the more difficult category 
to define from a First Amendment perspective is where there is 
some likelihood of some confusion—and we are not sure, as we 
know in likelihood of confusion analysis, what exactly that means, 
what percentage of consumers might be confused—and at the same 
time there is some First Amendment free speech value, there is a 
 
 56 See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 57 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. (KP III), 408 F.3d 
596, 607–09 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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use of the trademark that we care about from a free speech 
perspective, that we are willing to tolerate some confusion in order 
for that speech to happen.  That category is the one that I think is 
the most difficult to deal with, and yet that is the one that I think 
gets chilled the most and that we ought to be trying to figure out an 
answer to. 
PROF. KATYAL: Rob, do you want to weigh in? 
MR. WEISBEIN: Only to say that I don’t think you will ever 
be able to craft any statutory provision that is going to be so clear-
cut that if you do certain things, if you are in a particular category, 
you are home free, and therefore you will never have to litigate the 
issue of whether you have done something that is an infringing use 
or not. 
First of all, there is a use requirement that is written into the 
statute.  It says “the term ‘use in commerce’ means the bona fide 
use of the mark in the ordinary course of trade and not merely 
made to reserve a right in a mark.”  Then it goes on. 
I think, from reading the cases for today’s presentation, and 
just reading them in general as I need them during my practice, it 
seems that more often than not the courts are making that threshold 
determination, whether the defendant’s use of the mark is “use in 
commerce.”  If the court finds it is not, then they are protected by 
free speech, it can’t be an infringing use.  So a lot of times they are 
doing that analysis. 
But, as any good district court would do, they have to protect 
themselves.  So they go and they find there is no use in commerce, 
whatever use he is making of the domain name is fine; but if there 
is use, then there is no likelihood of confusion.  The court does that 
because they know the case is going to go on appeal, or is likely to 
go on appeal, to the circuit court of appeals and they want to make 
sure they are covered. 
So I don’t see that there is any way to avoid litigation, because 
even in the parody defense the court first has to determine whether 
or not what you are doing is a parody.  That is a litigable issue.  
You have to decide whether it is a parody.  Then you have to 
decide whether they are using it as a source indicator or not.  So 
there are just so many things to decide, you can’t just say, “Oh 
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yeah, that’s a parody.”  So I don’t see how you are going to avoid 
that litigation so the little guy is going to be able to get off without 
much investment.  I just don’t see that happening. 
PROF. McGEVERAN: “Home free” and “never have to 
litigate,” I’m with you 100 percent.  That’s not going to happen.  
“Better than current circumstances,” I think, is a reasonable thing 
to shoot for. 
PROF. KATYAL: Let’s hear from the audience.  Who has 
some questions?  We have someone with a microphone.  If you 
could just identify yourself before you ask your question. 
QUESTION: I have a comment on this last subject.  I see it as 
a combined problem of copyright and trademark.  What has really 
happened as I see it is we had the Internet explosion.  It is a 
democratizing force.  It is an incredible force.  It enables little 
people with no resources to speak to everybody.  It enables small 
people with a business idea to sell to everybody.  The backlash has 
been that giant corporations are in this incredibly litigious mode, 
with cease-and-desist letters, anything they can do, and lawsuits 
over everything, to punish everybody. 
As Bill points out, as Rob points out, the way litigation works 
in the United States is it costs money, and many people just fold 
because they just do not have the resources to fight. 
While it is true that every statute is going to be imperfect, I 
think if we value the robustness of the Internet, something has to 
be done to start making more carve-outs, and also to bring in a 
punitive element, namely attorneys’ fees, for people who bring 
frivolous cases where there is an obvious defense of the type that 
we know exists, of the types that Bill was mentioning. 
PROF. McGEVERAN: The second of those is in there, the 
exceptional case rule.58 
MR. WEISBEIN: If it’s an exceptional case.  But that 
oftentimes is an incredibly high standard to get that. 
PROF. McGEVERAN: In “Food Chain Barbie,” the ACLU 
got the $2 million from Mattel.59 
 
 58 See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(3) (2000) (“The court in exceptional cases may award 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”). 
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MR. WEISBEIN: It will be interesting to see in the Haute 
Diggity Dog case if the defendants go seek their fees now. 
PROF. KATYAL: I just want to thank Susan Scafidi for 
bringing me the “Chewy Vuiton” toy for my dog. 
QUESTION [Prof. Susan Scafidi]: It was a gift for Chika. 
Actually, I have the answer to that.  I don’t know the parties in 
the case personally.  I have met some of the attorneys for Vuitton.  
Pamela Reeder, one of the founders of Haute Diggity Dog, after 
the case came down wrote to me.  I asked her some questions.  I 
did ask her that question, because I said, “I hope you’re enjoying 
the champagne.”  She said, “Are you kidding?  I can’t afford 
champagne, [I’ve got] $300,000 in bills.”  I said, “Are you going to 
try to get it back?”  She said, “Our attorneys told us it’s very rare 
in trademark cases and they are not even going to try.” 
MR. WEISBEIN: That would be my feeling. 
QUESTIONER [Prof. Scafidi]: On the other hand, 
interestingly, I asked her how she felt about that and what she 
would advise other people similarly situated.  She is so thrilled to 
be an American right now.  She said she couldn’t believe how 
wonderful it was that the courts would look at the issue on the 
merits and not just look at the big company and take their word 
over a little company.  I was a little surprised in that circumstance, 
that after spending that much money she was still thrilled to get a 
legal outcome that she could be happy with.  But she is going to be 
stuck with the bill. 
PROF. KATYAL: Thank you, Susan. 
For those of you who don’t know Susan Scafidi, I recommend 
all of you to look at her blog, www.counterfeitchic.com, which is 
the place to be in trademark and fashion. 
PROF. McGEVERAN: I second that. 
 
 59 See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., No. CV99-85432RSWL(RZX), 2004 
WL 1454100 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2004) (awarding defendant $1,584,089 in legal fees and 
$241,797.09 in costs); Tom Forsythe, Artsurdism, http://www.tomforsythe.com/ 
bio_foodchain.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (stating that appeals fees and costs of 
approximately $300,000 added to trial court figures for a total of $2.1 million total in fees 
and costs). 
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PROF. KATYAL: Great.  Let’s go to another question. 
QUESTION: My name is Louise Cherkis.  I’m an LL.M 
student and an attorney. 
I think you have all mentioned quite a bit about what I am 
going to mention.  I’m thinking about whether there could be in the 
procedure area more protections that might help the little guy. 
I’m going to use an example of a situation that I dealt with this 
summer.  An individual had a domain name, “China Barbie.”  She 
had had it for years.  She didn’t have much business on it.  She was 
an exotic dancer, so you can use your imagination about that.  But 
it didn’t use the logo or any shapes and size, but it did have that in 
the name.  She had it for years.  All of a sudden, this summer, right 
at the time when Mattel was having problems in China, 
immediately a trademark infringement action was brought against 
her.  Immediately, the very next morning, there was an explosion 
of hits on her Web site.  Obviously, at that point then she could 
have had a commercial success in some way, but of course at this 
point you’ve got them weighing down on you. 
I was just sitting here listening to you and I was thinking, is 
there any way that perhaps—in a situation like that, where the 
person was going on for years with this thing, it wasn’t impacting 
on anything, it wasn’t the biggest deal.  In fact, she said everyone 
who danced used “Barbie” in her name one way or another; it was 
like a regular thing.  That they wait that long—once these people 
have these famous trademarks, if they are going to start targeting 
someone who has something for X time—maybe like a statute, 
let’s say, that after five years you really shouldn’t be coming after 
someone.  Really, it’s like they were creating their own monster in 
that kind of situation. 
PROF. KATYAL: Thank you.  Does anyone want to respond? 
MR. WEISBEIN: In the trademark law there certainly is the 
recognition of the equitable defenses of laches, estoppel, and 
acquiescence—you know, when did they know about her, when 
did they know or when should they have known about her; and if 
they had known about her for a long time and sat there and did 
nothing, she might have a valid defense that they can’t do 
anything.  Although, typically, those equitable defenses only go to 
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monetary damages and not to injunctive relief.  The theory is that 
the trademark laws are not only to protect the trademark owner 
who has a property right but also to protect the consumer from 
confusion.  So oftentimes laches and estoppel and acquiescence 
will stop the court from awarding a monetary damage but will not 
stop them from enjoining if they feel that there is confusion. 
QUESTIONER: I think there was a problem here also.  She 
was saying she can’t afford what she was going to end up going 
through.  But in a more general sense, by waiting that long, maybe 
there should be— 
MR. WEISBEIN: Like a statute of limitations. 
QUESTIONER: It may have been in their own self-interest for 
why they picked right then and there to do it. 
PROF. KATYAL: Other questions? 
PROF. FRISCHMANN: While we’re waiting for the 
microphone, I don’t think there is any easy way out of that 
situation, other than that’s consumer confusion, and that’s where 
you have to figure it out, highly fact-intensive, and so it is going to 
be costly.  It’s not surprising that she can’t afford that.  It’s one of 
those situations where you expect it to go that way.  I’m not sure 
you’d want it to go any other way, other than to work through the 
process. 
PROF. McGEVERAN: And, arguably, it’s closer to what Rob 
was talking about, individual businesses making those decisions. 
PROF. KATYAL: One thing that is really interesting about the 
example that you just brought up, though, is this question of 
market substitution, which I think comes up very nicely in the 
copyright context—that is to say, is the “infringing use” affecting 
the market of the original user?  I think it is fairly clear in this 
context that “China Barbie” is not a market substitute at all for the 
original Barbie.  So maybe one way to think about this question 
might be to look at importing that principle of market substitution 
into trademark, which might be another way of thinking about it. 
QUESTION: Will Tennant, LL.M student. 
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My question is about the Haute Diggity Dog case.60  I guess I 
understand why First Amendment implications come into effect 
when you have noncommercial use.  But I see this company 
basically free riding on Louis Vuitton and setting up a product and 
making money out of it.  And obviously, they had money to defend 
the infringement action, whereas in the China Barbie example they 
probably didn’t have money to do it. 
So I guess I’m asking the panel—it seems to me like it’s not 
blurring to the trademark extent, but it is blurring in my mind as to 
where does this commercial dichotomy fit in with First 
Amendment and with what we think is traditional First 
Amendment in the trademark context, which is gripe sites, political 
speech—I think we used in Professor Katyal’s class the Starbucks 
cup,61 which everyone has seen, where it is not necessarily 
commercial.  The other thing is in a gripe site you can’t sell your 
mugs.  Well, Haute Diggity Dog I think has a nice business selling 
their parody.  I just throw that out. 
PROF. FRISCHMANN: I’ll just say one thing and then let the 
other panelists jump in.  Where the use of someone else’s speech, 
someone’s trademark, is noncommercial, that invites First 
Amendment scrutiny or it invites a stronger consideration because 
the First Amendment interests are stronger there. 
But I do think it is a problem that I see both in copyright and in 
trademark, that commerciality of the use seems almost too strong a 
weight on the scale in terms of undermining fair use in copyright, 
let’s say, or being too strong in the trademark context.  It is still a 
regulation of speech.  Fundamentally, both copyright and 
trademark are regulating speech.  The question is: If it is not 
 
 60 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C. (Haute Diggity Dog II), 
507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007). 
61  Starbucks’ corporate logo features the company name and a mermaid.  In 1999, 
comic book artist Kieron Dwyer created a parody version of the logo replacing 
“Starbucks Coffeee” with the words “Consumer Whore” and depicting the mermaid with 
a cellphone and cup of coffee in hand. See Comic Book Legal Defense Fund, Cartoonist 
Kieron Dwyer Sued By Starbucks (Nov. 30, 2000), http://www.cbldf.org/pr/001130-
starbucks.shtml (last visited Apr 18, 2008).  The parodied logo was featured on the cover 
of one of Dwyer’s comics and also sold on t-shirts and mugs. Id.  Dwyer was 
subsequently sued by Starbucks for both copyright and trademark infringement and an 
injunction was issued against him. Id.  The parties eventually settled. Id. 
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misleading and it is not deceptive, then we want to think about the 
First Amendment because, even if I am using it commercially, my 
speech is still speech, it’s still something that we should think 
about how we are regulating it. 
But I do think you are right, that the balance of interest shifts—
that it’s a little bit different.  But just because something is a 
commercial use, just because someone is making some money off 
their ad revenues because people are actually going to the gripe 
site, or just because The Wind Done Gone62 made some money 
because they were sold commercially, that doesn’t undermine that 
there is actually meaningful speech happening. 
PROF. KATYAL: Can I actually follow up and ask you a 
question, Brett?  So are you suggesting that if you have someone 
who is using a mark that benefits them commercially—it seems to 
me that that does arguably fall into a gray area between 
noncommercial and commercial use.  It might raise the same 
values that we see in a noncommercial use context, but it is still 
being used commercially.  Do you think that the distinction that 
retains in First Amendment jurisprudence between political speech 
and commercial speech should be jettisoned in favor of strict 
scrutiny over all speech, whether it is directed towards a 
commercial use or not? 
PROF. FRISCHMANN: No, I don’t think we should apply 
strict scrutiny to all speech.  I think there is a distinction.  
Commercial speech and the First Amendment—and I don’t 
traditionally think and write in the First Amendment area too 
much; that’s something I’m starting to write in and I have a few 
things in the works. 
Commercial speech is speech that proposes or executes a 
transaction, where you can think of a buyer and seller exchanging 
information through their speech.  That type of speech is speech, 
but it is of a different kind than speech that has an implication 
beyond just that transaction.  So I think that thinking carefully 
about what commercial speech and noncommercial speech means 
 
 62 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(infringement case concerning parody use of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With the Wind). 
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in the First Amendment context, what that might mean in 
copyright and trademark, is a little bit—how can I say this better? 
Copyright and trademark do not currently think along the lines 
that First Amendment law thinks of in terms of distinguishing 
between commercial and noncommercial.  We might benefit from 
thinking along those lines somewhat.  So even in the First 
Amendment context, as I understand it, you can have 
noncommercial speech where the person who is engaging in the 
speech still gets some money from the activity that they are 
engaging in.  It is not contingent upon whether someone is making 
money; it is contingent on the nature of the speech, of what is 
being said and how it is being said. 
I think we need to think in the same way when we are talking 
about when I am using someone else’s copyrighted material or 
when I am using someone else’s trademark to say something.  It’s 
the nature of my speech, at least at the first instance, that helps me 
understand: Is it commercial—“Am I proposing a transaction or 
executing a transaction, or am I saying something different?”  
That’s a slightly different question than “Am I profiting or making 
money from engaging in that speech?” 
I think that is a distinction that requires some thinking.  I don’t 
have hard and fast answers right now about how it works out. 
MR. WEISBEIN: You have to remember that the test to 
determine trademark infringement or dilution is a likelihood of 
dilution or a likelihood of trademark infringement.63  Sometimes 
whether somebody is making money off of it or not may have an 
impact in that determination. 
But simply because Haute Diggity Dog was making money 
from it, if there was no confusion, if there was no likelihood of 
confusion of the consuming public, if people don’t think that the 
Haute Diggity Dog “Chewy Vuiton” toys were manufactured by 
Louis Vuitton or in some way authorized by Louis Vuitton or 
associated with Louis Vuitton, then there is “no harm, no foul.”  
That is what the court found, that it was a parody, that it was so 
 
 63 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000) (prohibiting “use [of a mark] in commerce . . . 
[where] such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive”). 
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hilarious and so humorous nobody in their right mind could have 
been confused, and therefore it wasn’t trademark violation.64  End 
of story.  Doesn’t matter that they might have a successful 
business. 
PROF. KATYAL: Next question.  Diane? 
QUESTION [Prof. Diane Zimmerman]: I was just going to add 
to that that it is not uncommon for something that is commentary 
to result in a product.  You can imagine lots of instances where 
people sell things on T-shirts and in other sorts of ways that are 
just simply intended to be commentary but they are being sold as a 
commercial product. 
The second thing is that I think we have to be very careful 
about this distinction between commercial speech and 
noncommercial speech, because if you read the Supreme Court’s 
past decade of commercial speech cases carefully, it isn’t so clear 
to me that the distinction between fully protected and commercial 
speech is all that different or will in fact survive. 
So I think one ought not to be led down the garden path on this 
distinction, because I am not sure it really exists anymore. 
PROF. KATYAL: Great point 
QUESTION: My name is Britton Payne.  I’m a recent Fordham 
graduate.  I work not only for Darby & Darby but for Rob, as a 
matter of full disclosure. 
PROF. KATYAL: And sorely missed here at Fordham. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Payne]: The Haute Diggity Dog case 
broke down parody into three elements: you identify with the 
famous mark; you distinguish yourself from the famous mark—so 
you not only recognize that we’re talking about Louis Vuitton but 
you also see immediately it’s “Chewy Vuiton,” so you identify it, 
you find it distinctive; but then the third element that they talked 
about was that there was some sort of comment on the mark.  They 
talked about how silly it is to give an expensive bag to a dog to 
chew up.  That kind of leans toward the idea that not only should 
 
 64 Haute Diggity Dog II, 507 F.3d at 260–61 (“[T]he juxtaposition of the similar and 
dissimilar—the irreverent representation and the idealized image of an LVM handbag—
immediately conveys a joking and amusing parody. . . . The satire is unmistakable.”). 
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we be looking at the nature of the use in terms of commerciality, 
but in terms of is there in fact a statement. 
Which reminds me, Rob, of your “Mutant of Omaha” example, 
which really, to speak to Will’s point, seems to be about free riding 
on this identifiable mark that others have created for no purpose of 
commenting on Mutual of Omaha in any way. 
I wanted to bring out that, with Louise’s point about “China 
Barbie,” that is also trying to trade on this image of Barbie that has 
been created.  She didn’t call herself “China Peppermint Patty,” 
she called herself “China Barbie.”  She used a recognizable mark 
to free ride and sell her product, her service—actually I’m not sure 
how to quantify that. 
PROF. FRISCHMANN: Or both, as the case may be. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Payne]: But I don’t feel like you see that 
in many of the parody cases, where they don’t seem to care 
whether or not Roy Orbison was being commented upon in the 2 
Live Crew case.65  Just that it is a funny song; it uses someone 
else’s material.  “When Sonny Sniffs Glue,” as the parody of 
“When Sonny Gets Blue,”66 was that a comment in any way on the 
original song or was it just using the song to do a whole other thing 
unrelated to the song?  It seems to me, in part, like free riding, 
which maybe should be addressed in this way. 
PROF. McGEVERAN: Justice Souter might not be convincing, 
but he does try to suggest that “Oh Hairy Woman” is a comment 
on the naïve—I can’t remember the phrasing, but something like 
the “naïve sentimentality of the Roy Orbison original,” or 
something.67  I’m not sure Luther Campbell thought that, but 
David Souter thought that. 
 
 65 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 66 Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 67 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583 (“[W]e think it fair to say that 2 Live Crew’s song 
reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some 
degree.  2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes 
true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal 
responsibility.  The later words can be taken as a comment on the naiveté of the original 
of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and 
the debasement that it signifies.”). 
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I understand what you are saying, but I think we do have to be 
careful, because, as Judge Kozinski says, part of the reason we are 
concerned about the availability of these marks for expressive uses 
in other contexts is that they are such powerful symbols.68  Diane’s 
colleague, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, has a wonderful quote where 
she says that these days all of us understand who Betty Crocker is 
but none of us understands who Hestia is, the Greek goddess of the 
domestic hearth.69  So our common lingua franca and 
understandable cultural references are often trademarked. 
Sometimes it may well be acceptable to use what some may 
call “free riding.” Others might see it as using a cultural reference 
that is universally understandable and has been powerfully spread 
to us all through mass advertising for the purposes of making some 
other point. 
The “Taft Quack” example I used had nothing to do with 
AFLAC or its services.70  The defendant was using this irritating 
duck, which was one of the most constantly repeated and 
recognizable advertising images of the decade, to make some 
comment about his political opponent.  I would say we want to 
preserve his access to the mark to do that.  I’m not sure that’s 
parody necessarily, maybe it falls under some other justification, 
but I wouldn’t want to wall that off. 
MR. WEISBEIN: And the same is true when marks take on a 
second life, they have a double meaning.  So when you say “this is 
the Rolls Royce of whatever,” that immediately communicates to 
people that this is a high-quality product, it’s one of a kind 
perhaps.  I don’t think a trademark owner is going to be able to 
stop people from doing that. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Payne]: McDonald’s did, though, in the 
McSleep case.71  They were attempting the same kind of use there. 
PROF. McGEVERAN: That was a close call. 
 
 68 Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 972–73 (1993). 
 69 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in 
the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 424 (1990) (“Betty Crocker has 
replaced Hestia in the public consciousness.”). 
 70 Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 691 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
 71 Quality Inns Int’l v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 221 (D. Md. 1988). 
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PROF. FRISCHMANN: I just want to make two quick points. 
One, free riding is great.  Seriously, though—Don’t forget, we 
free ride all the time.  Free riding is competitive.  Free riding is 
encouraged.  Talk to a bunch of economists; they’ll say “free 
riding is great most of the time, or at least sometimes.”  So don’t 
fall victim to thinking that “there is free riding happening here—uh 
oh, let’s throw up our hands in the air and figure out how to solve 
the problem.”  It’s not necessarily a problem.  It’s not necessarily a 
problem that needs a solution.  Sometimes the absence of free 
riding is a problem.  That’s one thing. 
So yes, sometimes there is free riding in these cases, but that 
doesn’t tell us anything about what the law ought to be doing.  
That’s the first point I want to make.  Now don’t get me wrong.  I 
don’t think free riding is always okay and always great.  My point 
is that it is sometimes.  It depends on what our goals are. 
My second point is parody—here is an argument I’m thinking 
about making as I write some of these ideas out for future work.  I 
think parody is overly constraining.  I think the Supreme Court 
made a mistake in the Campbell72 case when it characterized 
transformative use and they overly, narrowly restricted the notion 
of transformative use to parody.  This I think is true of trademark 
too.  Why do we care that you are commenting on the original? 
Why can’t you make social commentary on something else and 
that still is a meaningful transformative use of the underlying 
work?  It seems to me that if you make a meaningful social 
commentary about something other than the work,—and we see 
this in the Koons case73 and a couple of other cases, where courts 
are starting to recognize that transformative use is arguably quite a 
bit broader than parody. 
The Wind Done Gone74 case sort of stretches and strains to call 
what’s happening parody.  Maybe it’s a parody, but I think a 
stronger and easier argument to make is that it is a transformative 
use that comments in a significant way on society and on some of 
 
72  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 73 Blanch v. Koons, 396 F. Supp. 2d 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
74  SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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the themes and ideas that were in the original book.  It is 
commenting, not necessarily making fun of or engaging in parody. 
I think that if I am right, at least to be compatible with the First 
Amendment, perhaps we need to think about fair use and our 
notions of parody a bit more broadly.  Parody might be an example 
of something broader.  Sticking too narrowly to that example or 
that narrow subset may be excluding other concepts of what ought 
to be acceptable uses and permissible uses—or perhaps mandatory 
uses under a First Amendment approach if you are pushing on that 
button really hard—opens up the way we think about, both in the 
copyright context and fair use, but also in the dilution context, for 
example. 
I think dilution raises some problems from a First Amendment 
perspective, because you are no longer talking about misleading or 
false speech; you are talking about perfectly legitimate, lawful, 
truthful speech and saying, “You can’t do it because my mark is 
famous.” 
To say that’s only going to be okay if it’s a parody, I think is 
perhaps too narrow of an exception to think about whether or not 
we ought to be able to restrict that type of speech. 
Diane, you have been talking a bit about that issue. 
PARTICIPANT [Prof. Diane Zimmerman]: I actually think 
that the free speech arguments are really strong in trademark in 
comparison even to copyright, because if you consider that 
copyright is an exception to the First Amendment, trademark is 
nowhere in the Constitution.  It seems to me that it can only exist 
logically if it is consistent with general First Amendment 
principles.  I think it is interesting that that is not the way it is 
usually thought of. 
PROF. McGEVERAN: And by the way, it is not for limited 
times either. 
PARTICIPANT [Prof. Diane Zimmerman]: No, it certainly 
isn’t. 
PROF. KATYAL: Great.  Thank you. 
We have time for a couple more questions. 
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QUESTION: Sandra Aistars.  I’m actually a copyright lawyer 
rather than a trademark lawyer, but just listening to the discussion, 
and particularly this last bit here, and thinking about issues that 
come up in my practice all the time, I’m curious where you think 
things like brand tarnishment fit into this. 
I work for Time Warner.  In particular, if you think about some 
of the brands that we have at Turner—cartoon characters intended 
to appeal to kids—imagine a situation, and this is actually a 
situation we did face, where the sound track from a Yogi Bear 
cartoon was replaced with dialogue about Yogi and BooBoo 
smoking pot and carrying on.  It was very funny.  Posted on 
YouTube.  From a copyright perspective, maybe I’d let it go.  It’s 
not commercial.  It’s not necessarily a fair use, but maybe I am 
willing to be a bit more flexible about it.  But from a brand 
perspective, if it is a brand that you are trying to market to kids and 
keep that brand appropriate for the audience that it is targeted to, 
I’ve got more concerns. 
I wonder where the panel and where others commenting on the 
topic fit that into the dialogue. 
PROF. KATYAL: Great question. 
MR. WEISBEIN: Well, there actually are other Yogi Bear 
cases.  There was the Yogi Bear case where I think Yogi was used 
for commercial speech, where some group that was objecting to 
the government’s policy on cutting down trees took Yogi and they 
had him in an ad or a poster with a saw.  He was hiding a chainsaw 
behind his back.  I thought I had the slogan written down here.  In 
that case, they found that it was perfectly permissible fair use.  I 
don’t remember if they found that was a parody, but they permitted 
it.  I’m not sure that your case would be all that strong. 
PROF. FRISCHMANN: I think—and I said this earlier this 
morning, and I may have mentioned it in my talk earlier—you are 
right, and especially in the Internet age.  I agree with what Rob 
said much earlier, which was that all of these First Amendment 
issues existed before the Internet.  Absolutely.  Don’t take me to 
think that the Internet caused all these new problems to come out 
of nowhere.  Of course not.  It has been around for a while.  But I 
think it certainly, from a bottom-up perspective, gives rise to many 
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different types of cases and situations where people are speaking 
and using other people’s trademarks and copyrighted material in 
order to speak in a lot of different ways. 
There are lots of brand management/brand image problems that 
arise exactly because of that, because people use the trademark to 
say something on YouTube, and it is controversial, and it doesn’t 
fit in with the business plan of how they want to manage their 
brand.  That’s why we will see lots of these disputes. 
I agree there are disputes.  I agree with Rob in the end that the 
law is not on the side of the brand manager, although dilution law 
was an attempt to get the law on the side of brand managers, I 
think, at least for famous marks. 
QUESTIONER [Ms. Aistars]: But I think in some of the 
examples you’re talking about it is helpful, certainly from a brand 
manager’s perspective, if the speech is at least commenting on the 
brand.  I think it is a different situation if the speaker on YouTube 
was making fun of Yogi Bear and whatever political or cultural 
references they could comment on in the actual trademarked 
character and in the actual trademarked cartoon.  I think when that 
is absent that makes for a much tougher case, at least to my mind. 
PROF. McGEVERAN: For one thing, if I were the defense 
lawyer in that case, I would argue that my client was making fun, 
just as in the 2 Live Crew case.75  I would say by having Yogi talk 
about prohibited dangerous subjects I am exactly making a point 
about his clean-cut image and it is a parody directly.  I think you 
could make that case. 
But more broadly, I guess, I am sympathetic to your plight, but 
in the end I think there is sort of a “sticks and stones” issue here, 
which is that brand managers are entitled to some degree of control 
over the perception of their brand, but they are not the only people 
driving that perception, any more than famous individuals are 
entitled to be inoculated from ridicule.  Famous people get 
ridiculed all the time and they deal with it. 
PROF. FRISCHMANN: I do think that there is logic to it.  I 
don’t think I’m convinced by it, but there is some logic to the idea 
 
 75 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994). 
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that you tie the use of someone’s mark or copyrighted work to a 
parody about the original back to the work.  It’s got to be tied back, 
commenting on the original.  The logic is if you are commenting 
on something else other than the original, it is necessarily 
incident—to comment on the original you need to use the original. 
However, if I am going to comment on a broader social 
phenomenon—let’s say you take the Dr. Seuss commentary on the 
O.J. case.76  You take that example—which I thought was wrongly 
decided, but regardless—and it is not commenting on the original.  
The reasonable, logical argument—not one that I find very 
convincing—but nonetheless the logic behind it is that you have to 
recognize that there are alternative substitutes.  If you want to 
comment on something else and it is not on me or on my mark or 
on my work, there are available alternatives.  Use one of the other 
available alternatives, not mine.  That’s the logic behind it, that 
there are available alternatives.  There aren’t alternatives in the 
context of parody. 
The reason I am not convinced by that logic is oftentimes the 
work that is chosen by the speaker, the commenter, or the 
trademark itself, is a powerful vehicle for the speech.  So why 
should I have to choose a less effective means for communicating 
this message or engaging in this commentary than the one I am 
choosing?  That is where I think the balancing can get tricky.  I 
think there is a logic behind the parody, but nonetheless I think it is 
overly confusing. 
MR. WEISBEIN: I think your case involves what was at issue 
in the Freecycle case,77 which was the issue of trademark 
disparagement.  There is no claim in the Lanham Act for trademark 
disparagement.  So I am not sure what you are going to be able to 
do. 
PROF. KATYAL: Great.  Thanks. 
One last question and then we’ll break for cocktails. 
 
 76 Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (The Cat is NOT 
in the Hat used Dr. Seuss’ trademark style to recount the O.J. Simpson murder trial). 
 77 Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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QUESTION: I just wanted to say I think the problem with the 
commenting philosophy is that it increases the subjectivity.  It is a 
very philosophical question.  Different people would decide it 
different ways.  The same judge might decide it differently on 
different days or with slightly different changes in the facts. 
I think the one thing we don’t need in fair use is to have more 
subjectivity.  We need less.  We need it to be more objective and 
predictable. 
Throughout the years, my advice to anybody, for twenty-nine 
years now, is if someone asks me a fair use question, the answer 
always is, “(a) it probably is or it probably isn’t, and (b) it will cost 
you a few hundred thousand dollars to find out because you won’t 
know for sure until the jury comes back with its verdict.” 
PROF. KATYAL: I think that is definitely true. 
Before we break, let’s hear a last word from Tara Waters, who 
is our Editor-in-Chief. 
MS. WATERS: Thanks, Professor Katyal. 
I just wanted to close today’s event and thank everyone for 
coming.  It was a really fantastic day. 
Once again I wanted to recognize Ryan Hopkins, who is really 
the mastermind behind the whole event. 
And of course, our distinguished panel speakers all day who 
have been really fantastic and fascinating.  I think we had a lot of 
great discussion today. 
Just as a quick reminder, the CLE certificates are going to be 
available at the desk where you checked in. 
Join us outside for some cocktails and hors d’oeuvres. 
Thank you. 
